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We investigate the problem of simultaneous determination of labour market institutions and outcomes in single equation multi-country estimations by presenting an empirical analysis of unemployment and union density in 20 OECD countries. When explicitly modelling potential endogeneity and heterogeneity, our results suggest that unions contribute in different ways to explain unemployment than what previously thought. In addition, the relationship between unemployment and union density is heterogeneous across countries depending on the way in which the income support to the unemployed is organised. 
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Introduction
In recent years we have witnessed a growing literature on the impact of labour market institutions on labour market performance. This has resulted in a number of multi-country models aiming at estimating an empirical relationship between institutions and a labour market performance. A recent literature review by Bassanini and Duval (2009) suggests that unemployment benefits and the tax wedge are the most significant institutions affecting unemployment, this result applying across alternative population subgroups. For what concerns trade unions, the empirical literature does not seem to suggest an unemployment-enhancing role. The theoretical literature usually regards unions as raising unemployment and reducing labour input, through wage rise above competitive levels. These effects are, however, offset if unions and employers coordinate their wage bargaining activities (Nickell et al 2005). 
One possible limitation of previous studies is that multi-country models estimating unemployment as a function of labour market institutions implicitly assume labour market institutions as super-exogenous. This is to say that institutions do not depend on the state of the labour market and estimated parameters are independent of changes in policy. However, this simplifying assumption is often contradicted by our knowledge of how institutions are determined. If institutions are coordinating devices that are introduced and modified as optimal answers to market failures, they cannot be taken as fully exogenous to market outcomes. In addition institutions come in clusters, and therefore different institutional aspects can be characterised by either substitutability or complementarity (Amable 2003). More generally, under a political economy approach all institutions could be considered endogenous. Potentially, this may then result in biased and inconsistent estimates when endogeneity is not correctly modelled. Even if we were to give to the endogeneity problem an omitted variable interpretation, the inclusion of country fixed effects may account only for the omission of time invariant unobservable factors while some relevant omitted factor may actually vary over time. A practicable remedy would be to instrument institutions​[1]​ in a single equation setting, while modelling unemployment and/or union density. However the true model is likely to be one where institutions and unemployment are simultaneously determined.




In the economic and sociological literature we find several papers that consider the relationship between unemployment and union density running in one direction or in another, but none of them (at the best of our knowledge) has never taken into account the simultaneous co-determination of both of them. Let us first consider what is known.

Union density → unemployment rate
There are several theoretical reasons accounting for positive as well as negative association between union density and unemployment. If we consider union density as predetermined, in an imperfect competition framework an increase in union membership raises union bargaining power and, as a consequence, their wage claims. A rise in the bargained wage yields an overall increase in unemployment, thus creating a positive correlation among the two variables (Nickell and Layard 1999). In addition, changes in union density may affect the quality of the relationship between employers and employees, therefore influencing unemployment through different channels than the wage (Blanchard and Philippon 2004). Nickell et al (2005) show that labour market institutions explain a relevant portion of changes in OECD unemployment since the 1960s. However, considering the contribution of institutions and macroeconomic shocks, in a single equation model with an AR(1) error component, the role of union density is found marginal with respect to other dimensions such as taxation and unemployment benefits. In addition, higher coordination in wage bargaining seems to reduce the positive correlation between union density and unemployment. Similarly, Bassanini and Duval (2009) do not find any direct effect of unions' bargaining power (as proxied by union density) onto unemployment, whereas they find support for a significant role of various measures of corporativism and/or centralisation of the wage bargaining. When interacted with labour demand shocks, union density seems to exhibit a positive correlation with unemployment, despite the finding is not robust to alternative model specifications.​[3]​

Unemployment rate → union density
Using the opposite perspective, Checchi and Lucifora (2002) treat unemployment as predetermined and explain the demand for union protection in terms of macroeconomic cyclical indicators (proxied by inflation and unemployment rates), compositional effects (gender, age and sector composition of the labour force) and other competing labour market institutions, discussing their potential complementarity/substitutability impact. They argue that whenever unions are perceived as providing workers' insurance against unemployment risk (Burda, 1990), higher unemployment has a positive impact on union density. This applies only in countries where unions provide effective insurance (as in the so called "Ghent countries", where unions are involved in managing the unemployment benefit schemes - see Holmlund and Lundborg, 1999), whereas for all other institutional contexts, the correlation between the two variables is negative, because greater unemployment weakens the bargaining power of unions, thus reducing the incentives to join them. Similarly, Checchi and Visser (2005) claim that unemployment may be thought of as creating a demand for union protection, but the main effect is, probably, the shift of market power to employers, making it more difficult for unions to accomplish their goals. In order to disentangle these two potential effect, they interact unemployment with a variable identifying countries adopting the  ‘Ghent system’ of unemployment insurance (so named after the Belgian town where it was first introduced), finding that for the very same countries the unionisation levels tend to be higher for any given level of unemployment, and that union membership is likely to increase in times of rising unemployment.

Discussion
	Our main point is that both approaches existing in the literature neglect some relevant aspect. While we accept the idea that higher membership implies stronger unions, due to larger support and greater financial resources, this not necessarily translates into higher wage pressure. For at least two reasons: on one side rational unions leader should take into account the type of feedback on their membership originating from unemployment (if the unions knew that raising unemployment would hinder the number of their potential members, they would probably moderate the wage claims). On the other side the positive correlation between union density and unemployment is rationalised in models where a median union member maximise his/her expected income vis a vis a profit maximising firm acting in a competitive market. However both unions and firm could take into account an external constraint coming from foreign competition, as well as long run accumulation of capital (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003): in this framework the wage push would be substantially attenuated, or even reversed (as in the Swedish model of union wage compression – Hibbs and Locking 2000). Overall, we do not believe that unemployment and density are necessarily positively correlated. This is more likely to occur whenever unions are less coordinated and/or more decentralised, not perceiving the consequences of their wage claims onto general labour market conditions and wherever government abstain from intervening in labour disputes. Otherwise the correlation could be absent or even reverse sign.




We conduct our analysis for the 20 major OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) observed over the period 1964 – 2000. Data sources and descriptive statistics are reported in the working paper version of the present article.
We study the simultaneous determination of unemployment and union density, while controlling for a set of remaining labour market institutions (unemployment subsidy, employment protection, tax wedge and wage bargaining coordination). Among all labour market institutions, union density is the result of a decentralized decision making process and therefore is more prone than other institutions to suffer of endogeneity with respect to labour market outcomes. On the contrary, institutions such as employment protection, benefit provision, taxation are rather products of a political deliberation process and therefore are less likely to be clearly determined by the status of the labour market. These institutions are however controlled for in our estimates.
Figure 1 displays the dynamics in unemployment and union density in the OECD countries constituting our sample, from 1960 to 2000. Most countries in our sample have experienced a significant decline in union density in the last decades, often accompanied by an increase in unemployment. Notable exceptions are the Nordic countries, experiencing an upward trend in density rates, and the Anglo-Saxon countries, with no trend in unemployment (at least starting from the 1980s). This suggest testing the presence of potential heterogeneous patterns in the relationship between union density and unemployment across these countries.
	Table 1 provides a set of joint estimates of unemployment and union density equations as suggested by the literature (Checchi-Visser 2005, Nickell et al 2005). In the first two columns we present a SURE model, which is equivalent to a system where all right-hand-side variables are treated as exogenous but error terms are correlated across equations. These estimates are therefore comparable and indeed consistent with previous estimates in the literature. Union density positively affects unemployment whereas the positive effect is generally reduced by an increase in wage bargaining coordination. In addition, unemployment is positively correlated with union density, which points to the idea that the perception of increased risk of unemployment calls for some sort of union protection.  However we know from previous work (Checchi and Visser 2005) that this effect is heterogeneous across countries, depending on the way in which the unemployment subsidy system is managed. 




The  results preented above have been obtained imposing a homogeneous structure on the coefficients, i.e. assuming that the correlations between the variables are the same in every country in the sample. This is a strong assumption, though often used in multi-country estimations. However, many authors in the literature have stressed the importance of considering (labour market) institutions as part of a comprehensive social model rather than single dimensions that can be separated from the context. Assuming homogeneous coefficients may then give a misleading perception of a unique modus operandi of market economies, which is heavily disputed by some political economists (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Table 2 presents the estimation of the same system of equations on different countries, grouped according to their union system. After exploring the correlation between unemployment and union density at country level, we divide the countries in four groups: the so-called Ghent countries (the Scandinavian – Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden - plus Belgium), the Mediterranean countries, (Spain, Portugal, Italy and France), the continental European countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland) and finally the Anglo-Saxons countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States plus Japan). Non-European plus the UK and Ireland). These groups tend to differ along many dimensions, and there is no consensus in the literature about which is the most appropriate way to group OECD countries.​[4]​ What we take into account here are the two dimensions which matters in our analysis: relevance of unions (as captured by membership) and generosity/universality of the unemployment subsidy. Looking at sample means for the relevant variables, one could argue that the first group (ghent) is characterised by pervasive union presence combined with generous unemployment subsidies, financed through taxation. Despite the tax wedge being high, the presence of effective wage bargaining coordination contributes to low unemployment. The second group (mediterranean) exhibits weaker union membership (due to lower unionisation rates of France and Spain), associated to relatively high unemployment; the less generous attitude towards the unemployed is partially compensated by stricter employment protection. In the third group (continental) we find lower unemployment associated to higher wage coordination and generous treatment of those on dole. Finally, the fourth group (anglo-saxons) combines decentralised wage settings, weak employment protection and poor income support for the unemployed; in such a framework, unions may gather members but they are unable to significantly affect the flexible working of the labour market.
In Table 3 we then replicate  the system estimation of the aggregate model shown in table 1 on each country group defined as above. The estimates suggest a certain degree of heterogeneity in the relationship between density and unemployment. Compared to the results obtained in table 1 (columns 3-4), the impact of density on unemployment is now always significant, though changing sign according to the country group. In addition, the effect of unemployment onto density is attenuated (before it was estimated at 1.87) and is positive for Nordic countries only (which were probably  pulling the overall sign in aggregate estimations ). More specifically in Ghent countries, strong unions do not induce an increase in unemployment, while workers increase their militancy in periods characterized by higher unemployment. This represents a "union rise" scenario, where an increase in unemployment has a positive impact on union density, either through appropriate institutional arrangements (like the unemployment benefit system managed by unions) or by affecting the union attitude in the bargaining process. At the same time, unions are sufficiently coordinated and/or centralised to exert a negative impact onto unemployment (other things remaining constant). 
Southern European countries are instead characterized by stronger unions when unemployment is low, and are potentially subject to divergent unemployment and union patterns. In a dynamic perspective,  each variable feeds back negatively one onto the other. Here two scenarios are theoretically possible: one with high unemployment and low density (like in the case of France or Spain) or vice versa (as in the case of Italy in a large part of the sample period). Continental European countries are characterized by an unemployment enhancing role of unions although significant at the 10 percent level only. More surprisingly, union membership seems not affected by unemployment. 




We have presented an empirical analysis of the joint data generating process of unemployment and union density for 20 OECD countries. We show that unions are not necessarily detrimental to unemployment, thus accounting for non controversial results found in the literature with respect to this issue. Similarly, unemployment does not always have a negative impact on union density, depending on how unemployment benefits are administered (whether through unions or through public/private ents). The combined effect of these feedbacks has been initially estimated in a multi-country framework, then allowing for country-group heterogeneity. We identify four patterns of unemployment-union density interplay, from a “union rise” scenario (Ghent countries) to a “union decline” scenario (Anglo-Saxon countries).
If we should speculate about the available strategies currently opened to unions, we would point to the combined effect of wage-setting and employment\income-protection set-up. Our results indicate that countries where unions administer unemployment schemes as well as act as ‘wage regulators’ are not necessarily doomed to disappear, just the opposite. However, this scenario is not immune from political considerations. Indeed, in the last decades the wage regulation role of unions have been heavily disputed in market economies. Wage-setting unions is almost automatically associated to wage compression, and this is what is probably hard to accept by a large fraction of dependent workers. Further research is probably needed in this respect, as well as regarding the potential role of unions in terms of providing workers with instruments for coping with financial volatility circumstances.
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Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Each equation include country and time dummies.


Table 2: Country group characteristics, time averages







Table 3: Joint models of unemployment and union density, allowing for heterogeneous effects
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Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Each equation include country and time dummies.

Table 4: Model simulations
	GHENT	MEDITERRRANEAN	CONTINENTAL EU	ANGLO-SAXONS










^1	 	See, for example, the analysis by Nunziata (2005) on wages.
^2	 	Employment protection regulations, taxation, minimum wage and unemployment benefit policies are all determined inside national or regional parliaments and therefore are affected by political factors such as the timing of elections and political deliberations, voters' preference structure, the policy makers' agenda, the existence of stable political equilibria. They evolve at a slower pace than macroeconomic variables, being the product of political processes that do not necessarily (or directly) depend on the status of the economy only.
^3	 	This finding is sensitive to the different measures adopted for the other institutional variables. Blanchard (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of the recent literature on the relationship between institutional measures and unemployment.
^4	 	For example Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME) according to the type of relationships between firms and within each firm. Among the former group they list United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland, while in the latter they include Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway). Amable (2003) combines factor and cluster analysis in order to characterize alternative models of capitalism. When concentrating on a set of dimensions including product markets, labour markets, finance, welfare and education, five groups of countries are identified: market-based economies (akin to LMEs of Hall and Soskice: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States), the social-democratic model (the Nordic countries except Norway), the continental European model (Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Germany, France and Austria), the Mediterranean capitalism (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the Asian capitalism (Japan and Korea). The OECD Economic Outlook (2004) provides a classification of countries in terms of degree of coordination/ centralisation of wage bargaining. According to this perspective, a vast group of countries exhibits high levels in coordination/centralisation (CC). This group includes Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Australia, Austria and Ireland. Another group is characterized by an intermediate degree of CC (Belgium, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Japan). A final small group is decentralised (France, Italy, Canada, Korea and United States).
